This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate A enjoys an advantage over the other candidate D. Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some xed distance . The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.
Introduction
Often the media tells us about Candidate So-and-so's charisma, hand-shaking skill, great speech delivery, or lack thereof. Yet only rarely do these features nd leading roles in the simple spatial models that political scientists have e m braced as the tool of choice to study candidate competition in mass elections. This paper takes the simplest non-trivial extension of the standard Downsian model in this direction, and explores the implications for the equilibrium positioning of candidates. With this seemingly trivial addition of realism into the model things seem to change very dramatically. Pure strategy equilibria fail to exist even in a single dimension where voters have single-peaked preferences. Candidates diverge, and this divergence occurs in predictable ways. Candidates with charisma end up reinforcing their advantage by adopting relatively more centrist platforms on average, while the ugly, clumsy, and inarticulate ounder on the periphery of the policy space.
The implications of our model are actually more general than simply an investigation of the e ects of charisma, or other exogenous" candidate characteristics. The results apply for any particular non-policy advantage one candidate has over another, which is valued by all voters. Thus, endogenous political phenomena such as o ce holding experience, incumbent performance, constituency service, and advertising campaign expenditures can also generate similar e ects. Because these advantages or disadvantages can arise for either endogenous or exogenous reasons, we lump all of them together and simply view these e ects as image". In addition to the candidate-speci c image dimension, there are also broader valence" issues Stokes, 1963, pp. 170-4 , such as economic performance Kiewiet 1983 and military success, that are irreversibly linked to a candidate through his or her party's past and current performance. There is ample evidence that such issues are very important in elections, and such factors need to be incorporated into the standard models. To wit:
It will not do simply to exclude valence issues from the discussion of party competition. The people's choice too often depends upon them. At least in American presidential elections of the past generation it is remarkable how many valence issues have held the center stage. Stokes, 1963, p. 171 More recently, Popkin et al. 1976 come to a similar conclusion about the 1972 U.S. election: The voter cares less about which candidate is the closest to his ideal position on issues for which he has information and preferences, but cares most about which candidate can deliver the most" p. 793. Since we nd here that even small asymmetries along the image dimension or divergent voter perceptions of candidate competence on valence issues can generate signi cant electoral e ects in equilibrium, this may help explain why empirical studies in political science often nd these kinds of e ects play important roles in campaigns, candidate entry decisions Banks and Kiewiet 1989 , and incumbent longevity Kiewiet and Zeng 1993. There are several recent papers that have begun to investigate the theoretical properties of equilibrium in the presence of candidate image e ects. The closest are Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000 and Groseclose 1999. 1 Those papers investigate di erent variations of the model we study in this paper, and they focus only on pure strategy equilibria. Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000 focus on candidates that maximize the probability of winning in a world of certainty. They nd that, when a pure strategy equilibrium exists, the advantaged candidate locates centrally, and there is no restriction on the location of the disadvantaged candidate who always loses. In Groseclose, candidates have policy preferences of their own, which are su ciently weighted in their objective function to guarantee pure strategy equilibria. Policy preferences of su cient magnitude can overcome the problem of nonexistence of pure strategy equilibrium Groseclose 1999. If two candidates maximize expected vote or probability of winning, when the median voter's location is random and are purely o ce-motivated, then pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist except in uninteresting boundary cases, such as when there is no uncertainty.
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This result is indeed very general, covering rather arbitrary policy spaces. The intuition is simple. The advantaged candidate wins all the votes if he exactly copies the location of the disadvantaged candidate. Thus, the disadvantaged candidate must mix in order not to bepredictable. However, in order for mixing to beoptimal for the disadvantaged candidate, the advantaged candidate also must be mixing.
Several other papers have examined formal models of candidate equilibria where there are asymmetries between the candidates. Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985 and Berger, Munger, and Pottho 2000 look at incumbency advantages, and explore equilibria when candidates locate sequentially. Londregan and Romer 1993 also look at competition with incumbency e ects. Wittman 2000 adopts a sequential location approach, in a model that looks at the role of pressure groups. Sequential approaches like these avoid the nonexistence problem of simultaneous location choice, but leave open the question of what is the correct sequential model, which can be problematic since results typically depend on order of moves.
None of the above papers investigates the properties of the mixed strategy equilibria of the simultaneous location game. That is what we do in this paper. In section 2 we present the basic model, where the policy space is a nite grid of points on the 0; 1 interval, voters have Euclidean preferences, the location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and candidates choose policies to maximize probability of winning. In section 3 we solve for closed form solutions of mixed strategy equilibrium when the size of the advantage enjoyed by one candidate is relatively small. It turns out that the solutions are slightly di erent depending on whether the policy space consists of an even or an oddnumberpoints, so we analyze the two cases separately. The basic techniques in the two cases are similar, so we only include the analysis of the even case in the body of the paper. The odd case is treated in an appendix, where we also prove that the two solutions converge when the policy space grid becomes ne. In section 4, we analyze the properties of the equilibrium found in the previous section for large n: We compare the expected payo s of the two candidates, and look at limiting cases, in which the advantage is arbitrarily small and the policy space grid approaches a continuum. We nd that the advantaged candidate always has a higher expected payo in equilibrium, but this equilibrium advantage shrinks to zero in the limit. In section 5 we explore three di erent extensions of the model: non-uniform distributions of the median voter's ideal point, larger values of the advantage, and existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in the case of continuous locations. We conclude in section 6.
The Model
The policy space, , i s the set of n points on the 0; 1 interval, x i = i,1 n,1 , i = 1 ; 2; : : : ; n . There are two candidates, A and D, who are referred to as the advantaged candidate and the disadvantaged candidate, respectively. Each candidate's objective is to maximize his probability of winning the election. Each voter has a utility function, with two components, a policy component, and a candidate image component.
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The policy component is characterized by an ideal point in the policy space , with utility of alternatives in the policy space a strictly decreasing function of the Euclidean distance between the ideal point and the location of the policy, symmetric around the ideal point. We assume there exists a unique median location, denoted by x m . Candidates do not know x m , but share a common prior belief about it. This commonly shared belief is represented by a probability distribution over , and is denoted by a vector of probabilities, 1 ; : : : ; n , where i 0, i = 1 ; 2; : : : ; n and 1 + : : : + n = 1: We denote by m the median of the distribution . The image component is captured by an additive constant to the utility a voter gets if A wins the election. That is, the utility that a voter with ideal point x i obtains if A wins the election is U i x A = , j x i , The game takes place in two stages. In the rst stage, candidates simultaneously choose positions in . In the second stage, each voter votes for the candidate whose election would give him the higher utility. In case of indi erence, a voter is assumed to vote for each candidate with probability equal to 1=2.
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Since the behavior of the voters is unambiguous in this model, we de ne an equilibrium of the game only in terms of the location strategies of the two candidates in the rst round. A pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of candidate locations, x A ; x D such that both candidates are maximizing the probability of winning, given the choices of the other candidate. We denote by A x A ; x D and D x A ; x D the probability of winning for candidate A and for candidate D, respectively, as a function of x A ; x D .
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A mixed strategy equilibrium is a pair of probability distributions over , A ; D , such that there is no mixed strategy for A that guarantees higher probability of winning than A , given D and there is no mixed strategy for D that guarantees higher probability of winning than D , given A .
Derivation of Mixed equilibrium
For the rest of this section, we consider only small values of , such that 0 1 n,1 . This simpli es the derivation of equilibrium considerably. In the last section, we consider what happens for larger values of . When = 0, neither candidate has an advantage, and we are in the standard Downsian world. In this case, when the distribution has a unique median, the two candidates both locate at the median m. The two candidates each win with probability :5. Otherwise, there are multiple equilibria because there is no unique median location. All of these equilibria involve the two candidates mixing between the two median locations. As is evident from this, the even and oddcases will have to be treated separately for the case of 0: When 0 There is never an equilibrium in pure strategies. The intuition is simple. If the disadvantaged candidate's location is perfectly predictable, the advantaged candidate can copy that strategy and win for sure. Therefore, at least the disadvantaged candidate must be mixing. The result extends easily to larger values of , and is true unless is su ciently large that A can locate at the median and guarantee a payo of 1. In general, if n 2 , 1, then there will be no pure strategy equilibrium. In what follows, we limit attention to uniform distribution of the medians, and to strategies that have a particular symmetry property. Speci cally, each of the mixed strategy distributions of the candidates are symmetric around De nition 1: A strategy for candidate j is symmetric if ji = j;n,i+1 .
Also, at least in this section, we will limit attention to equilibria in which there are no gaps." That is, the support of each candidate's mixed strategy is an interval. Formally:
De nition 2: A strategy for candidate j has no gaps if there exist integers i; k such that 0 i k n and jt 0 i f and only if i t k.
We will show below, by construction, the existence of symmetric equilibria with no gaps, for this case of small . We h a ve not been able to rule out the possibility that there are mixed equilibria that are asymmetric and or have gaps.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume there are an even number of locations and is uniform, unless speci cally stated otherwise. The analysis for the odd case is given in appendix A. In this section we derive the symmetric equilibrium strategies with no gaps for a xed even value of n, greater than or equal to 8. The equilibrium mixed strategies for n = 4 and n = 6 are described in section 3.4 as examples. Symmetric equilibria with no gaps are solved by 1 equating the payo s of adjacent locations, and then 2 nding one of the endpoints of the support. If adjacent locations x i and x i+1 are used with positive probability by candidate A in equilibrium, then their expected payo s probability of winning must be equal. For example, if locations 1 and 2 are both in the support of A's mixed strategy, then it must bethat:
If we denote by k A the rst location in the support of A 0 s strategy, then we have a collection of n , 2k
A + 1 equations of the form: 
where the partial sums continue up to the point where the subscripts become either less than 1 or greater than n.
Imposing symmetry, A k = A n,k+1 we obtain the mixing probabilities of A:
10 Note that for low v alues of n this formula needs to be adjusted at the bounds. 11 For some values of i in the summation expressions below, subscripts are out of range e.g., i = 1, in which case those terms are set equal to 0.
Equilibrium in symmetric strategies
From the set of equations 1 we obtain the rst proposition about the equilibrium strategy of candidate D, provided D's mixing probabilities are symmetric around That is, the disadvantaged candidate's mixing distribution is U-shaped, with the least probability weight in the center. In contrast, candidate A's mixing distribution places monotonically decreasing weight on strategies that are further from the median. Intuitively, the disadvantaged candidate must di erentiate his policy from the advantaged candidate. Completing the picture, the advantaged candidate locating in the center of the policy space in a probabilistic sense, e ectively forces" the disadvantaged candidate to tend to adopt more extreme positions again, in a probabilistic sense. A strategy for A that assigns positive probability to a location less than k D can beimproved on by a strategy for A that moves all that probability to location k D , but is the same in all other respects. This yields strictly higher expected payo s to A since, by assumption, D is placing some probability o n k D : Similarly, a strategy for D that assigns positive probability to a location less than k A , 1 can beimproved on by a strategy for D that moves all that probability to location k A , 1, but is the same in all other respects. This yields strictly higher expected payo s to D since, by assumption, A is placing some probability on k A . We cannot rule out D placing positive probability on k A , 1.
Recursive derivation of equilibrium
If we rst consider the equations determining the A mixing probabilities from the D indi erence equations in order to nd the mixed strategy equilibrium, we have: 
From these recursive equations, we can derive a symmetric equilibrium equilibrium with no gaps. There is always exactly one equliibrium in which the two candidates mix over the same support. Sometimes there is a second equilibrium, which is the same for A, but D mixes over a slightly wider support that includes one additional position to the right and one additional position to the left. There are no other symmetric equilibria with no gaps. 
where S D 0 = 1 : Observe that these coe cients are an increasing function of j; therefore they are all larger than 1, which implies that the probability that each policy is assigned by candidate D's strategy increases as we m o ve a way from the center. From before we know that since for all 1 j j or 1 j j + 1 we obtain in each case a unique symmetric probability distribution that solves the constraints of candidate A, thus it de nes the equilibrium mixed strategy of candidate D.
This result does not rule out other equilibria which are either asymmetric or have gaps. We conjecture that for small there are no equilibria with gaps.
Examples
Since the derivation above only applies to the case of n 8 we computed directly the solutions for smaller odd values of n. These are given in the table below. 13 We also show the two symmetric equilibria with no gaps for the case of n = 10, since it illustrates that the support of candidate A's mixed strategy can bestrictly smaller than the support of candidate B's mixed strategy. . However, notice that n A is not monotonically decreasing in n. Thus it is not clear how the size of the advantage to A changes as n changes. Thus, we next address the question: What is lim n!1 f A n g? This is an interesting question, since if we let n get very large, we approach the standard Downsian model in which candidates locate on the 0; 1 continuum. Furthermore, as we take this limit the advantage to A is in nitesimal, since we are assuming Proof: In the proof we only consider limits of sequences of even values of n: A similar proof applies for the odd case. The expression on the RHS of 3 has three terms. What we prove is that the second and the third terms each converges to 0 in n, which leaves only the rst term, implying that lim n!1 f D n g = 
Limiting properties of the mixed strategy support
We can show that the proportion of locations that are used with positive probability in equilibrium goes to zero in n.
Theorem 4: lim n!1 k n=n = 1 2 .
Proof:To simplify the proof we go directly to the limit where the policy space is the 0; 1 interval, and the n=2 location corresponds to 1=2 and is arbitrarily small. . Then, in the limiting case we are considering, this means that there is a subsequence such that the common support of the two candidates' equilibrium strategies along this subsequence converges to 1=2 , ". We now show that this cannot be an equilibrium. Consider the 14 This also follows directly, since we already showed earlier that 0 D n 2 A n 2 . 15 That is, voters will vote for the closest candidate unless they are equidistant, in which case they will vote for A. This, together with the previous result about expected payo s implies that the solution converges to the standard median voter result. Candidates' policies converge to the median and each candidate expects to win half the time.
Extensions
In this section, we look at three extensions of the model. The results of the previous sections were derived assuming that the A's advantage was small. That is, voters closer to D than to A always vote for D, so the quality advantage enjoyed by A only came into play when a v oter was equidistant from A and D. The rst extension relaxes the assumption that the distribution of median voter's ideal point is uniform. The second extension we consider retains the assumption of a nite policy space, but considers what happens if is slightly larger, so that some voters will vote for A over D, even if D is closer. The third extension relaxes the assumption of a nite policy space, also considering the case of larger , but where the policy space is the 0; 1 interval.
Non-uniform distribution of voters

Voters in three positions
Let n = 3, so there are 3 possible locations, a; b or c; where a; b; c 2 R and a b c. The probability the median voter is located at ideal point i n a is denoted by , similarly the probabilities she is located at ideal points b or c are denoted by and respectively, with + + = 1 : Suppose that the utility functions of the voters are as the described in the previous sections, and assume that 0 max fa , b; b , cg. To solve for a totally mixed strategy equilibrium we equating these payo s we obtain: i.e. zero probability that the median is in the center, both candidates mix uniformly over the three locations. In this case, D wins 1=3 of the time. At the opposite extreme, as approaches 0, A places all probability at 1=2 and D places all probability at the extremes. The probability that D wins, converges to 0.
Voters in four positions
Consider the previous model with four positions, a b c r; with median voter probabilities given by , , , and , respectively. And consider the symmetric case in which = ; = ;and + = ; D b = 0; so the advantaged candidate places all weight in the two central locations, while the disadvantaged candidate places all weight at the extremes.
5.2 Larger : 1 n , 1 2 Next we consider the case candidate A wins not only when the median voter is equidistant or closer to A than to D, but also A wins if D is closer to the median voter by only 1=n , 1. That is, 1 n , 1 2. It turns out that in this case there are gaps in the mixed strategy distribution, asymmetries, and non-monotonicities, which makes it di cult to derive a solution using the same algorithm as above. To c heck i f w e can use our recursive method of equating payo s from adjacent strategies, we used the Gambit 1999 game solver software to compute the equilibrium of the game, for a range of low values of n. The results are reported in the table below, which demonstrates that there are gaps in the equilibrium strategy of D. We do not know whether there can be gaps in the equilibrium strategy of A: There are other peculiarities that are troubling, and suggest that our methods for the case of small will bedi cult to apply. For example, the equilibrium is not necessarily symmetric, in which case there exist equilibria in pairs, which are mirror images of each other. Also, to obtain limiting result that are di erent from the results for small , w e w ould have to consider values of that increase as n increases. Otherwise, for example if we require 1 n , 1 2 for all n, will be driven to 0 in the limit, so we will e ectively be back in the small case. Thus, we also computed some examples for higher ranges of and nd that the gaps proliferate as increases. Because of these kinds of problems, we are unable to obtain a general solution for the large case with a large nite numberof locations. .13,.18,.18,.18,.18,.13,0,0 0,.31,.13,0,.05,.05,0,.13,.31,0 12 0,0,0,.19,.10,.20,.20,.10,.19,0,0,0 0,0,.26,.15,0,.07,.07,0,.15,.26,0,0 24 . . . ,0,.009,.08,.05,.07,.17,.10,.10,.17,.07,. . . . . . 0,.20,.13,.01,.05,.04,0,.03,.03,0,.04,. . . 
Continuous locations
The approach in the rest of this paper was to study a model with a nite number of feasible locations, and a small advantage. The ndings above, for larger , suggest that a di erent approach m a y be required to get further results. A natural alternative approach is the continuous location model, where the policy space, , consists of all points in the 0; 1 interval. As before, suppose that the median voter is uncertain, and the prior beliefs of the candidates over the location of the median voter are uniform on 0; 1 ; and candidates maximize the probability of winning. The proof of Theorem 1, that pure strategy equilibria fail to exist unless = 0 ; still applies.
While a mixed strategy equilibrium is guaranteed with nite locations, a mixed strategy equilibrium is not necessarily guaranteed to exist by the standard theorem for games with continuous payo s Glicksburg 1952, since the payo function is discontinuous. The problem is related to the kind of discontinuity that arises in a game studied by Sion and Wolfe 1957, and later by Dasgupta and Maskin 1986 . In this game, however, the discontinuities satisfy the technical condition of weak lower semi-continuity, as well as upper hemi-continuity of the sum of payo s, and payo discontinuities are restricted to a special small subset of strategy pro les. Therefore, we can appeal directly to Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin 1986, p. 14 to establish existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in this game.
Theorem 5: Let = 0; 1 and 0. A Nash equilibrium point exists in mixed strategies.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The theorem can be proved under much less stringent assumptions. For example, the proof given in the appendix is easily adapted to allow for non-uniform distributions with continuous, strictly increasing CDF's. Preferences do not have to be tent" preferences, and need not even beEuclidean, provided they are single peaked. One could also allow for heterogeneity of across voters, but at considerable cost of notation.
Conclusions
This paper has taken a rst step toward solving for the mixed strategy equilibrium of a simple game between two candidates, in one dimension where one of the candidates has an advantage, and candidates only care about electoral success.
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Because of payo discontinuities in the continuous location formulation of the problem, we look at equilibrium in a discrete policy space. We nd that the advantaged candidate will locate more centrally than the disadvantaged candidate, and always has an equilibrium advantage, i.e., A wins with probability greater than :5. However, if we look at the limiting case where the advantage becomes arbitrarily small and the discrete grid on the policy space becomes arbitrarily ne, we obtain a payo continuity result, i.e., in the limit A and D each win with probability :5. Examples suggest that these results may generalize to nonuniform distributions. For the case a coarse grid of strategies, we obtain some intuitive comparative statics results with symmetric non-uniform distributions. In particular, we nd that as the distribution of the median voter becomes more certain, the equilibrium advantage of A increases. And, as we know from Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, in the limit A wins with probability 1, when there is no uncertainty. In the other direction, when the variance of the distribution of the median voter is maximal, D has a fair chance 1=3 of winning.
We also prove existence of equilibrium for the continuous location problem, for arbitrary values of . A natural next step, is to solve for the mixed equilibrium in the continuous location setting.
There are some interesting possibilities for embedding this model of candidate advantages into more complex and realistic models of campaigns. For example, Wittman 2000 has shown how one can include factors such as endorsements to signal quality to the voter. One can also look at the e ects of campaign spending and advertising campaigns to a ect voter beliefs about candidate quality. This would add a stage at the beginning of the game we studied here, in which candidates can choose spending levels, and the advantage of candidate A will then depend on the spending levels of the two candidates. This would, in e ect, endogenize , which we assumed here to be exogenous. Such an extension would result in a combination of the spending game approach o f Erikson and Palfrey 2000 with the asymmetric competition approach presented here.
7 Appendix A: n odd We will show by construction the existence of symmetric equilibria with no gaps for the case of small when the policy space consists of an odd number of locations n 7 and is uniform. We also show that for large n the equilibrium strategies approach the ones found for the case when n is even.
As before, symmetric equilibria with no gaps are solved by rst equating the payo s of adjacent locations, and then nding one of the endpoints of the support.
A + 1 equations of the form:
where the partial sums continue up to the point where the subscripts become either less than 1 or greater than n. Therefore, we can solve the two recursive systems explicitly to obtain the following probabilities: for candidate A: Proof: If we equate the payo s that candidate A obtains from strategies k and k + 2 we obtain the following set of equations: That is, the disadvantaged candidate's mixing distribution is almost U-shaped, with the least probability w eight in the center, and increasing probability i n e v ery other strategy as they move away from the center. In contrast, candidate A's mixing distribution places monotonically decreasing weight on every other strategy that is further from the median. Even though in all our examples the disadvantaged candidate's distribution is U-shaped, in general it could produce a shape of two parallel U-shaped distributions since we can only show that the probabilities decrease every other location when approaching the center of the interval. Similarly, in the examples we nd that the distribution of the advantaged candidate is monotone at each side of the center of the interval, but in general we can only prove an approximation of it.
Equilibrium for n 7
Since the derivation above only applies to the case of n 7 we computed directly the solutions for smaller oddvalues of n. These are given in the table below. We will show that as n becomes large, the mixing distribution found in the last section approach the ones found for the case when n is even. We prove two lemmas, and the result follows directly from them. , w e h a ve that lim n!1 1 = 1. Now suppose that lim n!1 j = 1 for all j j 0 . In that case we also have that and for Suppose that n is even and consider the equilibrium strategies corresponding to A n ; D n ; A n + 1 and D n + 1. Given the previous results we have that Since for all n we have that 
